




               by 
         Toon van der Heijden, MA 
 HEAD SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ADVISORY  UNIT 
    CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 
NATIONAL POLICE AGENCY , THE NETHERLANDS
                      1. Introduction 
    Due to its nature, organized crime is not only difficult to combat
, it is 
also a phenomenon that is not easy to assess . In The Netherlands , criminal i
ntelligence units (CIUs) play an important part both in forming a good 
picture of organized crime and in the approach to it . Before giving you an 
idea of Dutch organized crime , I will focus for a short while on how CIUs 
gather and process information about criminal groups . In paragraph 2 the 
nature and extent of organized crime in The Netherlands is discussed 
on the b
asis of two different studies . Next, a series of measures that have been 
taken in the last ten years will be critically examined . At the end, a new way 
of analysing organized crime is proposed as the basis of a more effective 
approach to organized crime . 
   Organized crime should be dealt with by the police in a way that dif -
fers from the traditional forms of serious crime . In the case of types of 
crime, such as fraud and trafficking in drugs , usually no complaint is made 
by an actual victim. Forensic traces , such as bloodstains and fingerprints, 
are seldom found, partly because the crime is not perpetrated solely at o
ne 
location and at one time . Another characteristic of organized crime is the 
permanency of association agreements and protection from the outside world . B
ecause of all this, it is very difficult to find clues which provide a suffi -
cient basis for suspicion within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Act
.
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During their investigation, police officers are then obliged to have recourse 
to rumours from the criminal fraternity itself as a source of information. If 
such rumours reach their ears, they can continue their work in a targeted 
manner by using informers, tapping telephones and keeping individuals under 
surveillance. A large quantity of intelligence is collected in this way with 
varying levels of reliability. This intelligence is called "soft" to distinguish 
it from "hard" intelligence, which is so reliable that it can be used as evi-
dence at a criminal trial.! 
   In the Netherlands, the collection, collation and analysis of soft infor-
mation is the responsibility of special units within the regional police forces: 
the criminal intelligence units (CIUs). There are 25 regional CIUs in opera-
tion and one National Criminal Intelligence Division (CRI). The task of the 
criminal intelligence units is to promote the detection of crimes which, con-
sidering their serious nature, the frequency with which they are committed, 
or the organized manner in which they are perpetrated, cause serious viola-
tion of the legal order. With their intelligence work, the CIUs help to inves-
tigate natural persons and legal entities which could be involved in the per-
petration of these crimes. The intelligence work of the CIUs is not directed 
at furnishing evidence. Collecting evidence is the task of the tactical inves-
tigation department. The intelligence work, which is for the most part se-
cret, is not intended to be brought up for discussion at the trial, but has to 
produce information for steering the investigation process. This steering 
takes shape in the decision as to whether or not a tactical criminal investiga-
tion should be instituted, and the direction which a current tactical investi-
gation should take.The CIU functions as an important source for commenc-
ing tactical investigations. 
    Crime pattern analyses of organized crime can also be carried out on 
 the basis of CIU information. A national inventory of criminal groups has 
 been made periodically in the Netherlands since 1988. Analysis of CIU 
 intelligence has the great advantage over working with "hard" information 
 in that intelligence on active criminal groups is obtained at a much earlier 
 stage. Of course the limited reliability also causes concern about the quality 
 of the results of the analysis. For that reason, I shall deal in the following 
 paragraph not only with the results of an analysis based on CIU informa-
 tion, but also with the outcome of a scientific study of organized crime in 
 the Netherlands.
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    2. Nature and Extent of Organized Crime in the Netherlands 
    2.1 The 1995 National Inventory on Criminal Groups 
 2.1.1 The Research Method 
    In 1995, a national inventory on criminal groups was carried out for 
 the fourth time. This survey was based on data of regional criminal intelli -
 gence units (CIUs). Crime analysts filled in a structured questionnaire on 
 every active criminal group . A criminal group was defined as the coopera -
 tion of two or more people who are involved in crimes which
, in view of 
their impact or their frequency or the organized framework within which 
they are committed, represent a serious violation of the legal order . The 
questionnaires that were completed were processed at the National Crimi-
nal Intelligence division  (CRI) . In the analysis of the answers , a number of 
characteristics were used as selection criteria , in order to establish the orga-
nizational degree of groups . The following eight criteria were applied: 
   1. The group has a hierarchic system of leaders and subordinates
, with a 
  more or less fixed division of tasks between core members . 
  2. The group has an internal system of sanctions , such as intimidations, 
  acts of violence and sometimes even liquidations . 
  3. The group concentrates on acquiring income from different forms of 
  crime, depending on the profit opportunities involved in more than one 
  type of serious crime. 
  4. The group has criminal contacts with the world of trade and indust ry 
  and/or with government agencies (corruption) . 
  5. The group launders criminal earnings by investments in legal enter -
  prises, real estate, or in movable property or by foreign exchange . 
6. Business enterprises are being used as a front . 
  7. The core members have been acting jointly for over three years . 
  8. The group uses intimidation , acts of violence and sometimes even liq-
  uidations against competitors within the criminal world . 
   In the analysis of the data , the degree of organisation of a criminal 
group is determined simply by counting the characteristics . The more char-
acteristics present, the higher the degree of criminal organization . The des-
ignation "organized" is given to groups which complied with six or more of 
the eight criteria. The "at least six out of eight" formula takes into account 
both the diversity of organized crime and the fact that the police in the early 
stages of the investigation process usually do not have complete knowledge 
of all features of an active criminal group .
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2.1.2 Results of the National Inventory 
   In the 1995 inventory on organized crime in the Netherlands, exactly 
one hundred criminal groups met at least six out of the eight aforemen-
tioned criteria and were, therefore, denoted as organized. Ninety-three of 
the one hundred organized groups have been committing serious crimes for 
more than three years. Most of the groups (86) traffic in drugs, especially in 
hard drugs. Other forms of crime which are frequently perpetrated are ille-
gal trafficking in firearms (by 20 groups), and serious crimes against prop-
erty (35 groups) such as fraud, robberies, extortions and vehicle theft. 
   Almost all organised groups are characterized by a structure of leaders 
and subordinates, and a fixed division of tasks among the core members. 
Discipline within the groups is usually maintained by violence or threats of 
violence. Also persons involved do not refrain from violence outside their 
own circle: almost two-thirds use physical violence against competitors 
within the criminal milieu. A quarter of the groups are associated with liq-
uidations. 
    A widely recurrent characteristic of organized groups is the launder-
ing of the proceeds of criminal activities. Eighty-nine of the one hundred 
organized groups active in the Netherlands launder the proceeds of crime. 
This is done, interalia, by investing in legitimate businesses or heritable 
property or by channelling money by using routes abroad. Most groups also 
make use of cover firms; firms which function as a facade to cover up crimi-
nal activities. Three-quarters of the groups maintain contacts with the 
upperworld in some other fashion. The police, members of the business 
world and lawyers are mentioned especially in this context. 
    Almost half (44) of the organized criminal groups have a core formed 
completely of persons of Dutch extraction. In the case of a fifth of the groups 
the core is homogeneously foreign as regards origin. Turkey in particular 
 scores very high as a country of origin of core members. One quarter of the 
 groups have a heterogeneously formed core, where in most cases not only 
 foreigners but Dutch nationals as well call the shots. The analysis shows 
 that groups with a completely foreign core are more often associated with 
 violence both against their own members and others in the criminal milieu. 
 Dutch groups apparently maintain relatively more criminal contacts with 
 the upperworld. 
     Most organized groups are active at international level. Almost three-
 quarters not only operate in the Netherlands, but in other Western European 
 countries as well. Almost one-third commit crimes in Central and Eastern
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Europe. Of the countries outside Europe, Turkey , Morocco and Surinam, 
Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles are most frequently mentioned as areas 
of operation.
2.2 The Research Study by the Fijnaut Group
2.2.1 Research Method 
   The outcome of the national inventory of 1995 can be compared with 
those of a scientific study of "the nature , gravity and magnitude of orga-
nized crime in the Netherlands," conducted in 1995. The research was car-
ried out by a group at the request of a parliamentary commission investigat -
ing police investigative practices . In paragraph 3 the findings on the other 
parts of this parliamentary enquiry will be dealt with. For the study on orga-
nized crime a research group of four Dutch criminologists was formed un-
der the chairmanship of Dr. Cyrille Fijnaut . 
   The first priority of the Fijnaut research group was to provide an ac-
ceptable definition to guide their further research . The definition the re-
search group chose encompasses the following: 
   "There is  talk of organized crime when groups of people who are pri-
marily focused on illegal gains systematically commit crimes which have 
serious consequences for society and are capable of 
   succesfully protecting their interests, in particular by proving prepared 
to use corruption or violence to control or neutralize persons ."2 
   Various elements from this description correspond with the list of dis-
tinguishing characteristics used in the national inventory . This applies, for 
example, to the following aspects: organised crime is perpetrated by groups; 
the crimes committed are serious crimes, and corruption and/or violence 
are applied. Similarly, the definition also allows for some variation in the 
form in which organised crime appears (there is , after all, mention of "cor-
ruption and/or violence" ) and the defining is always done in general terms; 
there is only organized crime if several criteria are complied with . There 
are differences as well. The most important relate to the leaving out in the 
description of Fijnaut and company of hierarchy, division of tasks , cover 
firms and money laundering as typical characteristics of organized criminal 
groups. 
   Apart from the definition, the research method of the Fijnaut group is 
not the same as the one used in the inventory either. The group did not only
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make use of (confirmed) CIU data, but also acquired its information from 
the files of completed criminal investigations, interviews with representa-
tives of the police, judiciary, economic sectors and ethnic minorities. In the 
research report by Fijnaut c.s. few figures are presented. Differently from 
the national inventory, the investigation by the four professors has a quali-
tative character. Finally, the research group did not restrict its work to one 
calendar year. The study roughly covers the period 1990-1995. 
   The Fijnaut research group makes a distinction between three main 
types of criminal groups. Groups of the first type consist of native-born 
Dutch citizens, those of the second type of naturalised Dutch individuals 
who originally came from countries such as Turkey, Morocco and the former 
Dutch colony of Surinam, and groups of the third type consisting of crimi-
nals of foreign extraction.
2.2.2 Domestic Groups 
   The domestic groups are between thirty and forty criminal organiza-
tions which are engaged predominantly in traditional organized crime, with 
trafficking in soft drugs as the predominant feature. Apart from the produc-
tion amphetamines and other synthetic drugs, the Dutch networks do not 
have the production in their own hands. The Netherlands, with its Europort 
in Rotterdam and Schiphol International Airport in Amsterdam, occupies 
an ideal position as the gateway to Europe. The drugs that enter the country 
are therefore not only destined for the local market, but flow through the 
country to other European countries. 
   Besides drugs trafficking, these criminal organizations commit seri-
ous property crimes. Only seldom do they have a hierarchical structure. 
Mostly there are loose networks of individuals, groups and networks which 
sometimes cooperate and sometimes hinder one another. Dutch networks 
are sometimes quite large; some are made up of more than 100 persons. In 
total, the world of the Dutch trade in drugs is more aptly described as an 
extended network in which thousands of people, often operating in cliques 
or groups, are connected to each other in either transitory or permanent 
relationships or, where such relationships can be easily established via a 
friend of friends if and when the need arises. In these networks, pivotal 
figures and individuals and groups with more power than others can be 
discerned. Many of these relationships are not stable. The interests of vari-
ous groups or sub-groups may be incompatible and the personalities of the 
leaders can clash. Such conflicts can be resolved by using avoidance tactics
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or through violence . As a result, new sub-groups can come into being
, ei-th
er simply on a one-off basis to clear up a particular job (e.g. by jointly 
financing the project or by supplying materials or personnel) or ne w coali-
tions of longer duration can be established .3 
    According to the Fijnaut research group , Dutch organized crime is a 
diffuse and constantly changing network of individuals and group s. It has 
been found that domestic groups increasingly cooperate with crimi
nal groups i
n countries abroad. In a number of cases , the use of violence by domestic 
groups is intensive. These criminal organizations may have quite large sums 
of money. The proceeds of illegal activities are partly chan nelled in the 
criminal trade and partly legally invested in the Netherlands and abroad. 
Little has been found of structural intertwinement of criminal groups and 
the legal upperworld. Only few make investments in legal sectors such 
as 
the catering trade and real estate . The majority of the domestic criminal 
organizations use the monies earned by criminal activities for their own 
consumptive needs and for the improvement of the managing of affai rs. 
Nevertheless a real danger comes from the potential corruption of bona fide 
businesses as a result of money laundering . The available research suggests 
that forms of very professional fraud and money laundering constru ctions 
are relatively unknown to the police and justice system , but that these can 
do an inordinate amount of financial harm to our society .
2.2.3 Naturalised Groups 
    There are criminal groups active in the Netherlands whose members
, i
t is true, live in the Netherlands and often as well hold a Dutch pas
sport, 
but are not ethnically of Dutch origin . These are persons who belong to the 
three large ethnic communities in the Netherlands: Turks
, Moroccans and S
urinamese. Parts of these ethnic communities are involved in the s
mug-
gling of narcotic drugs to Europe. The reasons for their involvement in the 
drugs economy relate partly to their easy access to the producers and d
eal-
ers of the products in their homelands . Furthermore, the socio-economic 
position of these ethnic minorities in Dutch society is relatively low , and 
the increase in their income as a result of the trade and distribution of dr
ugs 
in their neighbourhoods must also influence their decision to become i
n-
volved and stay involved in the drugs world .
a Turkey 
   The Balkan route makes Turkey an important country for transitting
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illegal goods, especially heroin. Often customs officers are bribed for that 
purpose. The Turkish mafia is intensively linked to government services 
and the business community in Turkey. Apart from the traditional mafia 
activities, part of organized crime is carried out by political—criminal groups. 
Turkish criminal organizations are slowly changing from rigidly led, hier-
archical organizations to more loose-knit networks. The Turkish drug deal-
ers lead unobtrusive lives; many receive a social benefit. In a few cases, 
Turkish criminal organizations have been found to invest money in Dutch 
real estate projects. However, most of the criminal earnings are invested in 
Turkey, particularly in the tourist industry. The Turkish organizations are 
extremely violent in comparison with other criminal organizations.
b Morocco 
   Organized crime from Morocco has focused on the trade in cannabis 
and increasingly on hard drugs. There are indications that the Moroccan 
authorities and the judiciary assist the cannabis economy. Moroccan orga-
nized crime is not only criminal in nature, but also political. The cannabis 
sector has become essential for the Moroccan economy. Many Moroccan 
drug dealers invest in Morocco intensively. 
   Socially speaking, the Moroccan community in the Netherlands finds 
itself in a backlog situation, which is a breeding ground for crime. There are 
signals of large-scale theft of cars, trafficking in humans, but especially 
cannabis trafficking. Ingenious smuggling methods have been developed. 
A network of cannabis wholesalers and retailers is used for this purpose. 
Moroccan institutions are deeply affected. Moroccan organized crime is 
not very violent, which is remarkable.
c Surinam 
   In Surinam, several criminal groups are engaged in cocaine traffick-
ing. Surinam is a transit country for the supply of drugs to Europe. Some 
people there have become extremely rich as a result of this drug trafficking. 
There are indications that the former army leadership was involved in the 
trafficking and transporting of cocaine. There is some involvement of 
Surinamese subjects in organized crime in the Netherlands: drugs, traffick-
ing in stolen vehicles, prostitution. Drug trafficking partly consists of smug-
gling large quantities of hard drugs. Couriers and travellers smuggle small 
quantities of drugs into the Netherlands, also via part of the large distribu-
tion network of the Surinamese business community. A certain part of the
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population group is directly involved that way in drugs trafficking .
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2.2.4 Foreign Groups 
   There are several dozen criminal groups of foreign origin active in the 
Netherlands. The great variety of organizations , authors and crimes is typi-
cal of the role of foreign groups in the Netherlands . It is hardly possible to 
give a  general assessment. As with the naturalised groups , it is necessary to 
differentiate between the countries of origin of the various criminal groups
. 
The most important groups come from China , Colombia, Italy, the former 
Yugoslavia, the CIS republics and Nigeria .
a China 
   Chinese organized crime is mostly seen in the light of the triad struc -
ture. A small number of Chinese triads are active in the Netherlands . The 
power relations between them are constantly changing, whereby much vio-
lence is used. They are not solely responsible for Chinese organized crime . 
Investigations in other countries reveal that a sizeable Chinese community 
is a condition for Chinese organized crime to develop itself . On the one 
hand, the Chinese community in the Netherlands is well -integrated , while 
at the same time it is a world on its own in a social and cultural respect . 
Contrary to some other countries, the Netherlands does not have China towns . 
It remains unclear to what extent the Chinese community is involved in 
organized crime. It is clear, however , that the active triads use several Chi-
nese restaurants, gambling houses and videotheques .
b Colombia 
   In recent years, the Colombian drug cartels have grown very fast . The 
Colombians have acquired a considerable trading base in Europe . The Neth-
erlands especially has a function in a logistical sense . Our country simply 
appears to function as a dropping off zone for local as well as European 
markets, and not as an operational centre . About 75 percent of the cocaine 
discovered in the Netherlands has come from Colombia . The cartels are 
organized cell-wise as much as possible . There are several cells active in 
the Netherlands. They deal almost entirely in drugs . Almost the entire rev-
enues are returned to Colombia .
c Italy 
   Since the late Eighties, the Italian mafia has been active in the Nether -
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lands. The Camorra has been active in cocaine trafficking. The Netherlands 
is used as a trading place. It particularly concerns the making of logistical 
arrangements. Besides, other (non-Mafia) Italians are criminally active in 
the Netherlands. It is not clear how extensive Italian organized crime is in 
the Netherlands.
d The Former Yugoslavia 
   In several Dutch cities, Yugoslav gangs are active in trafficking in 
women, in cars, in burglaries and robberies, and much violence is used by 
these gangs. They are referred to as the so-called Yugo Mafia. They are 
separate groups which maintain contact, but are not in the least a unity, due 
to the ethnic differences. The gangs do not shy from intimidating police and 
judicial authorities. Their tough stance against the authorities is remark-
able.
e CIS Republics 
   Many opportunities awaited the Russian mob after the fall of the Ber-
lin wall. There is little to say about the number of criminal groups in Russia. 
The Russian mob is becoming increasingly internationally oriented, due 
also to the troops stationed until recently in Germany. The Russian commu-
nity in the Netherlands is only small. There are indications that Russian 
criminals are active on Dutch territory to a limited degree in trafficking in 
women, in cars, extortion, arms and drugs trafficking. However, the Rus-
sian mafia has not settled in the Netherlands.
f Nigeria 
   Nigerian organized criminals are especially involved in international 
drug trafficking, illegal car trade, fraud practices and trafficking in humans. 
The Nigerian groups which are active in the Netherlands are the extremes 
of large criminal organizations In a number of cases it was found that Dutch 
and Nigerian criminal organizations worked together.
  2.3 Evaluation of the Two Studies 
   Due to its very nature, it is difficult to assess the size of organized 
crime. According to the Fijnaut research group exact figures can therefore 
not be given. The group estimates that between thirty and forty domestic 
groups and a few dozens of naturalized and foreign groups are active in The 
Netherlands. This quantification is lower than the figure of a hundred orga-
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 nized crime groups found in the 1995 national inventory . The single most 
 important factor that explaines this difference is the use of assumed info
r-
 mation in the national inventory , where the Fijnaut research group only 
 uses confirmed information . An analysis of the inventory data in which 
 only answers based on confirmed CIU-information was used led to the re-
sult that 44 groups met at least six out of the eight criteria . This leads to the 
conclusion that when the differences in definitions and research method are 
taken into account, the difference in the quantitative results of the two stud-
ies is quite plausible . The same is true for the finding that Fijnaut describes 
some foreign groups that were not found in the inventory . This can be at-
tributed to the fact that the Fijnaut research describes a period of about five 
years (1990-1995), while the inventory concentrates on the criminal groups 
active at one point in time (i.e. the beginning of 1995) 
    Although the definition and other elements of the research method 
applied by the Fijnaut group differ from those used in the national inven -
tory of 1995, the qualitative results of both pieces of research work connect 
up well. The nature of organized crime in the Netherlands is very diverse . 
What is noticeable is that drug trafficking is the most common type of crime 
and that it is perpetrated on an organized basis . It is not surprising, there-
fore, that most organized criminal groups which are active in the Nether -
lands also commit crimes in other countries . It can also be seen that most of 
the naturalised and foreign groups which are active in the Netherlands do 
not originate from other member states of the European Union . The impor-
tance of the drugs trade for these groups should not be underestimated . This 
can be illustrated with statistics on seized drugs . Between 1985 and 1995 , 
the quantities of drugs seized every year by the Dutch police have increased 
considerably for most types of drugs . It applies both to cannabis products 
and cocaine and amphetamine . As regards heroin, it is concluded that no 
significant rising trend has been discovered (see graphs) . 
   Another indication of the growth of organized crime is the use of physi -
cal violence against (former) members of criminal groups and against com -
petitors on the criminal markets. Liquidations within the criminal world 
have clearly increased: from 11 in 1989 to 23 in 1993 and 31 in 1994 . Most 
of these liquidations were related to drugs trafficking . 
   The overview of available information can only lead to the conclusion 
that organized crime is a social problem of the first order in the Nether -
lands. This problem calls for measures to be taken swiftly .
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                        3. Measures 
   Organized crime is a problem that cannot be responded to with an ap-
proach that is "just more of the same". This was recognized more than ten 
years ago, in 1985, by the Dutch Minister of Justice. In a governmental 
policy plan entitled "Samenleving en criminaliteit" (Society and crime) he 
noted: "Although exact figures about this form of crime are scarce, the po-
lice and judiciary have the definite impression that this is a great danger 
threatening Dutch society, against which action should be taken urgently"4 
Based upon nothing more than this impression, the Minister of Justice took 
quite a number of measures. Criminal intelligence units (CIUs) were set up, 
and the instrument of crime analysis was introduced and further developed 
within the police. Bureaus for financial investigations have been installed, 
while legislation has been initiated in various fields, such as bills pertaining 
to the confiscation of illegally acquired financial assets, the reporting by 
financial institutions of questionable transactions and the penalization of 
actions in preparation of a criminal offence. Police forces throughout the 
country have started the formation of supra-regional teams, comparable with 
the special task forces that were operational in the United States during the 
Eighties, for conducting investigations into criminal organizations active 
on a national or international scale. 
    The following paragraph will demonstrate how some of the aforemen-
tioned measures have worked out in practice. Partly, the selection of mea-
sures evaluated is based on the available evaluation data and partly on the 
consideration that the measures might/could also be applied abroad. Two of 
the measures pertain to legal provisions in the field of financial investiga-
tions. It concerns the obligation for financial institutions to disclose un-
usual transactions and the increase in legal possibilities of confiscating crimi-
nal assets. Other measures treated in the following paragraph pertain par-
ticularly to the way in which CIU information is treated. The order in which 
 the various measures are treated more or less follows the order in the inves-
tigation process: firstly the collection of CIU information and subsequently 
 the application of crime analysis and the work of the interregional tactical 
 investigation teams. After that, the prosecution process which ideally fol-
 lows, is given attention, and the paragraph is concluded with an enlarge-
 ment on the results of a parliamentary inquiry into investigation methods 
 used by the police in their combat against organized crime in the Nether-
 lands.
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             4. A Critical Appraisal of Measures 
   4.1 Questionable Financial Transactions
    As of February  1st, 1994, financial institutions are required by law to 
report questionable transactions to the "Office for the Disclosure of Un-
usual Transactions" (ODUT). This new legislation is referred to as "Re -
porting Questionable Transactions" (RQT). Transactions are questionable 
whenever one or more indicators from a list of indicators , that has been 
established by a Ministerial Order , are applicable. The ODUT assesses which 
of the questionable transactions received are considered suspect . This is 
mainly done by matching personal data of the persons involved in the un -
usual transaction with the national file on CIU-subjects . The information 
on suspect transactions is then handed over to the Financial Police Unit of 
the National Criminal Intelligence Service (CRT). When criminal informa-
tion on the subjects involved is available , it is added to the transaction-
information. The CRI then disseminates the results among the regional po-
lice forces, where they may be used in, or lead to, criminal investigations. 
The RQT legislation serves a dual purpose: preventing abuse of the finan -
cial system for money-laundering and fighting money-laundering activities 
themselves. The ODUT is positioned as a buffer between the financial in-
stitutions and the justice system . 
   The new legislation has been subject to a scientific evaluation .5 Cen-
tral issues in the evaluation of the implementation of the RQT law were the 
workability and effectiveness of the new legislation . Special attention was 
given to preventive effects and to the extent to which transaction-informa-
tion was put to use in investigations. 
   Financial institutes have become more aware of the necessity of pub-
lic-private collaboration in the fight against money-laundering . In 1995 the 
ODUT received 16,215 reports concerning questionable transactions . Four-
teen percent of these were judged suspect and passed on to the police . The 
amount of money involved in suspect transactions was 165 million US dol -
lars. Approximately 1000 individuals were involved in these transactions . 
About 20% of the information on suspect transactions was used in new or 
current criminal investigations. The remaining 50% were recorded . This 
transaction-information could become relevant at a later point in time . 
   Financial institutions have become more wary of giving the police in-
formation than they were in the past , as a result of e.g. inadequate protec-
tion of customer identity. Police investigators consider this a major prob -
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lem. The computer system of the ODUT is deficient. This generates prob-
lems in the process of judging the status of transactions. The financial ex-
pertise of the ODUT is still insufficient, quantitatively as well as qualita-
tively. Due to these difficulties, "promising" transaction-information some-
times does not get enough attention. Important information may therefore 
remain unused. Problems involving computerization, manpower and qual-
ity were signaled in the transaction-information processing chain following 
the ODUT as well. The lack of financial knowledge is especially pressing 
at the regional level. The infrastructure of the processing chain has not been 
tailored to the efficient handling and distribution of the transaction-infor-
mation. Too many organizations are involved, which at their own discre-
tion, add and/or remove data to/from the transaction-information. Valuable 
information can get lost that way. Sometimes transactions get lost com-
pletely. All parties involved agree that the almost total lack of feedback in 
the process is a serious deficiency. The bank representatives hold the opin-
ion that there is not enough interest in the cross-border aspects of 
 moneylaundering activities and that the international systems of reporting 
transactions are poorly geared to one another, which hampers the exchange 
of information. 
    It can be concluded that the system of indicators and the obligation to 
report certain transactions have more or less been accepted by the banks 
and that the regime is workable. If the system of indicators is maintained 
adequately and, when necessary, improve, it will largely accommodate the 
needs of the parties involved. The systems of reporting transactions in Eu-
rope should be harmonized. The ODUT computer system needs improving. 
Also, the infrastructure of the transaction-information processing chain 
should be adapted. The aim should be for a quantitative and qualitative 
strengthening of the organizations that process and use transaction-infor-
mation. Fundamental investments are needed in order to enlarge the finan-
cial expertise and the knowledge of financial investigation among the po-
lice. The structure of communication between the law and financial institu-
tions requires care. Moreover, the feedback of information on the outcome 
of transactions reported is in urgent need of improvement. 
    It is clear that the RQT legislation has rendered placement of crimi-
nally-acquired capital into the financial system more difficult. But displace-
ment effects are apparent. The number of unusual transactions in 1995 was 
about 30% lower than in 1994. The figures for the first half of 1996 show a 
further decrease of about 15%.6 There are indications that criminals no longer
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make use of official financial institutions but use an informal
, underground b
anking system instead .7 As far as is known in 1995 only a few dozens of 
times transaction-information lead to the start of an investigation . Totally 
unknown is the number of times that transaction -information has led to a 
successful conclusion of an investigation . Therefore it must be concluded 
that the RQT legislation did not meet expectations , a conclusion which is 
even shared by the Dutch Minister of Justice .8
    4.2 The Deprivation of Criminal Assets 
In 1993 new legislation came into force in order to increase the statu -
tory powers of the police and the judicial authorities to deprive crimi nals of 
 their illicit earnings . Both the range of the deprivation order in the Criminal 
Code, and the scope for seizure were extended considerably . Recently a 
scientific evaluation of the effects of the new legislation was published .9 It 
appears that the public prosecution service puts in a great effort to set out a 
policy to stimulate a proceeds-based approach amongst the public prosecu -
tors. The research has made clear that the policymakers strive to extend th
e 
scope of the legislation to all profitable crimes . The latter contradicts the 
tenor of the political debate in which the legislation was seen prim
arily as 
an additional instrument to combat organized crime . Judges are inclined to 
agree with the political viewpoint and reject the line of the public pros ecu-
tion department. Consequently , judges are rather ambivalent to the legisla-
tion as a whole. 
   Despite the fact that the policymakers within the public prosecution 
department try hard to encourage the use of the new legal instruments
, so f
ar the daily practice has not passed off smoothly . Of course, the required 
change of mentality towards a proceeds-based approach takes a while . Be-
sides these starting problems the implementation process has been frus-
trated by the lack of knowledge within the public prosecution departm ent 
on financial affairs and civil law. Furthermore, the public prosecutors lack 
sufficient administrative support . 
   Within the police force the attitude towards the use of the new legisla -
tion is rather indifferent. The police management has adopted a strategy 
concerning "financial policing" and regards the deprivation of criminal as-
sets as an integral part of this broad concept . However, a specific strategy 
with regard to the confiscation of illegally acquired income has not been 
developed. Similar to the public prosecution department , the level of knowl-
edge amongst police officers on financial affairs and civil law is low . The
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policy makers with the police have not yet determined how know-how in 
financial matters can be increased. There are different views with regard to 
whether or not external financial experts should be contracted. An advan-
tage is that the necessary know-how becomes quickly available. Disadvan-
tages are the costs involved and the risk that confidential information is 
treated without the necessary discretion. As a result, the policy of the police 
and the public prosecution department is hardly geared to one another. In a 
number of cases the police has cooperated closely with the Fiscal Informa-
tion and Investigation Service (FIOD). This way the police could profit 
from the financial expertise of FIOD staff. But in some cases it resulted in 
tensions within the investigative team, because the FIOD staff was prima-
rily interested in tracing confiscatable assets and hardly or not at all in find-
ing proof for the involvement of suspects in the illegal activities. 
    Since the introduction of the new legislation the instrument is increas-
ingly used. From 1994 to 1995 the number of deprivation orders rose with 
40% to 969. The majority of cases were related to drugstrafficking and se-
rious property crimes. This sounds positive. But the value of the financial 
assets that were deprived in 1995 was less than four million US dollars, 
while the department of Justice had estimated revenues of about 16 million 
US dollars. One of the reasons for this rather poor result, apart from the 
mixed reception of the legislation by police, public prosecution and the 
judicature, is the fact criminals are very creative in hiding their financial 
 assets. One of the most frequently used hiding methods is concluding fake 
 lease contracts for expensive yachts and high performance cars, which in 
 criminal circles are also status symbols by eminence. To the outside world, 
 these objects are still formally the property of lease companies. However, 
 often these goods have been secretly paid for and lease contracts are fraudu-
 lently drawn up. Another problem was the calculation of the profits that 
 criminals have made with their illegal activities. In a number of court cases 
 defense lawyers have successfully claimed that expenses of their clients' 
 criminal enterprises were so high, that almost no profits were made. As a 
 result, already seized assets had to be given back. Other reasons for the 
 disappointing results of asset removal legislation have been the specific 
 problems in seizing objects abroad. They are the result of differences in 
 jurisdiction and cultural factors. Still, at international level, too, there are 
 positive results. Last year, for instance, a Dutch investigation team success-
 fully appealed to the Turkish judicial authorities for confiscation of four 
 hotels in Istanbul.
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   Just as with the Disclosure of Unusual Transactions legislation
, it has b
een found that enforcing a new act easily produces problems in practi
ce. 
Only an integral approach to the problem , with active participation of all 
social parties involved , will yield positive results. Furthermore , the experi-
ence with the two measures evaluated so far points to the importan
ce of 
intelligence gathering and analysing , not only regarding criminal activities 
but regarding financial aspects as well .
   4.3 Criminal Intelligence Units 
    Criminal information has in some way been systematically gathered in 
the Netherlands since the Seventies . Over the years, establishing and main-
taining contacts with informers and gathering criminal information in other 
ways, e.g. by observation , was increasingly becoming a specialist task . There-
fore, separate criminal intelligence units (CIUs) were set up in 1986
. There 
is no standard organization for the CIU in the Netherlands . In any case, 
there are runners, crime analysts and administrative staff working in ea
ch 
 CIU. A runner is the contact person of an informer of the CIU . The number 
of staff working in a CIU varies from 5 to over 80 persons . These extensive 
differences are closely connected with whether a surveillance team or 
a 
technical support unit comes under the CIU from an organizational point of 
view. 
    CIUs play the principal role in the so-called "pro-active phase" of the 
investigation procedure. In this phase no arrests have yet been made or house 
searches carried out, and data are collected only about the nature of the 
criminal activities and the structure of the criminal group . The CIUs gather 
information by deploying various methods of investigation
, such as work-
ing with informers, observation , analyzing information from previous in-
vestigations, and collecting financial information . CIU investigators con-
sider it their primary task to protect their sources of information . If they 
leave them unprotected, they run the risk of seeing them dried up soon . 
Their performance is dominated by finding an answer to the question "how 
do we make CIU information operational" or , said differently "how do we 
inform the tactical crime investigation unit without putting at risk the in -
former". As a result, the CIU cannot always comply with the need for infor -
mation that exists with the tactical investigation department . Some infor-
mation cannot be released for reasons of safety . In practice, CIU give tips 
as to the direction at which the tactical investigation should be aimed . 
   The relation between the tactical criminal investigation department and
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the CIU is complex and in many cases complicated. Often, the CIU knows 
more than the tactical investigation department. It is estimated that between 
10 and 50 percent of the CIU information is effectively utilized in a tactical 
investigation.10 This implies that much information is gathered without 
being used in an actual investigation. It also occurs that the CIU does not 
have the information that tactical criminal investigators require. Finally, 
there is the secrecy which the CIU sometimes maintains towards the tacti-
cal investigation department, and which sometimes results in troublesome 
relations. 
    The afore-mentioned factors are also active between CIUs themselves. 
Until recently, many CIUs had reservations with regard to cooperation. This 
was cause i.a., by the focus of CIUs on local and regional crime, as a result 
of which they did not feel the need for interregional cooperation. Organized 
crime, however is not bothered by national borders, and certainly not the 
borders of police regions. Sometimes, insufficient cooperation results in 
duplication of running informants and in unavailability of relevant infor-
mation. Partly, the reservations on the part of CIUs have been based on 
their desire to keep information for themselves only. The danger of infor-
mation leakage was considered to be too great. 
    Primarily, the CIU focuses on the traditional, criminal world, in which 
drugs trafficking stands out. The CIUs nowadays have insufficient know-
how to be able to tackle other areas of crime. CIU informers mostly have 
information about drugs crime and serious property crime, e.g. robberies. 
CIUs hardly have informants in other ares of organized crime, such as fraud 
 and environmental crime. Apparently, the division between upper and un-
 derworld also exists with CIUs.
  4.4 Crime Analysis 
   Organized crime mostly pertains to cooperating entities which are dif-
ficult to define and which are responsible for a variety of crimes in different 
locations. There is no unity of time and location as regards criminal activi-
ties. Individual positions are not fixed, but change frequently. Criminal 
working methods are adjusted in accordance with the circumstances. This 
results in the police normally having information on organized criminal 
groups which is far from complete and accurate. Already mentioned is the 
estimation that less than 50% (and perhaps no more than 10%) of the infor-
mation gathered by CIUs is used in a tactical investigation. In order to make 
the investigative process as effective and efficient as possible, the police in
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the Netherlands make extensive use of crime analysis.  In actual fact, crime 
analysts base their right to exist on working professionally with informa-
tion which is usually incomplete and partly unreliable. 
   Crime analysis can be described as "the identification of, and insight 
into, the mutual relationships that exist between crime data and other possi-
bly relevant data with a view to police and prosecution practices." 11 It is 
important to distinguish between the various objectives and areas of focus 
of crime analysis. An understanding of the data on crime is important, both 
with regard to specific investigations and in determining a certain policy 
directed towards the prevention and detection of crime. Consequently, there 
is a distinction between the operational forms of analysis which specifi-
cally focus on resolving a crime or series of crimes, and the strategic forms 
which are focused on policy making. 
   Strategic analysis aims to provide a helicopter view, to identify trends 
in crime and alert the appropriate law enforcement agencies. This allows 
for the initiation of long-term plans of action directed towards the emer-
gence of crime, rather than a mere reaction to single criminal incidents. In 
this way, operational activities can be directed, and investigation services 
can determine their targets. The most frequently used strategic form of crime 
analysis is "crime pattern analysis". The idea is to form a picture of the 
nature and scale of the crime in a particular area. According to the need, the 
area may be a country, a police region or a city. Examples are the national 
surveys on organized crime in the Netherlands referred to in paragraph 2. 
   Operational forms of crime analysis can help a police officer gain in-
sight and make information collected in concrete investigations accessible; 
they can also clarify areas in which information is insufficient or indicate if 
the various bits of information that have been gathered are conflicting. Op-
erational crime analysis can be a very helpful means during the investiga-
tion, particularly in complex cases with a lengthy time span, cases that in-
volve a great many subjects, in which the information is rather chaotic, or 
which, for whatever other reason, is incomprehensible and not straightfor-
ward. 
   The best known operational form of crime analysis in the Netherlands 
is "offender group analysis." The general idea is to present with the use of 
several kinds of charts as clearly as possible the available information re-
garding the relationships among the probable members of a criminal orga-
nization and their contacts. Often the top of a criminal group stopped its 
involvement in detectable criminal activities. The top hides behind front
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companies and other facades, and uses the most modern communication 
techniques to give orders without being recognized or tracked. Therefore, 
long lines of communication and command must be examined and analysed. 
   It is incorrect to regard crime analysis as a new phenomenon that has 
only just appeared out of the blue. In some cases, the way in which the 
crime analyst looks at data on crime is no different from the perspective of 
the police officer who has been doing the very same since time immemorial 
without ever dreaming of calling himself a crime analyst. However, in some 
aspects, their jobs and methods differ. Firstly, the analyst's job is to analyze 
the available information, not to collect is (as this would mean for him 
moving into the field of investigation too much). He adopts the position of 
the objective assessor of information, and he would be hindered if he were 
to collect the information himself. Secondly, a crime analyst tries to make 
intelligence out of raw data. He determines the reliability and value of the 
information which has been collected as accurately as possible. The analyst 
does not look at the significance of the separate bits of information only, 
but composes an overall picture that is as comprehensive as possible. 
   Crime analysis was introduced in the Netherlands ten years ago. Since 
then, it has proven to be a useful tool for crime control, especially when 
organized criminal groups are the subject of investigation. It is now normal 
to conduct an offender group or case analysis before starting a large crime 
investigation. Strategic crime analysis is used both at regional and national 
level to determine which criminal groups should be tackled first. Crime 
analysis has proven to be very succesful. Today it is a very significant tool 
for the police, especially in combatting organized crime. 
   Still, there is criticism from some on the present crime analysis activi-
ties carried out in the Netherlands. Criminologists find that crime analysts 
are one-sidedly oriented to information that is relevant in the sense of pros-
ecution. According to some heads of investigative teams the charting tech-
niques used by analysts result in beautiful images, which leads one to be-
lieve evidence can be picked up everywhere. Also, the relational diagram 
of an offender group would often unjustly suggest that there is a hierarchi-
cal structure. In reality, such a chart has the status of a hypothesis, which, 
later on in the investigation, may be confirmed or may have to be rejected. 
In strategic analysis, the findings are strongly affected by the way in which 
information is gathered and recorded. The quality of analysis, be it opera-
tional or strategic, is primarily dependent on the availability and quality of 
the underlying information. Professionally dealing with available data will
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extract all "intelligence" which it contains . However, it will not be a guar-
antee that the only possible solution of the criminal investigation will be 
found. Crime analysis does not lead to results that meet scientific standards 
of reliability and validity. Therefore , more information must be supplied to 
(potential) users of analysis reports, to acquaint them with the possibilities 
and the limitations of crime analysis.
   4.5 The Penal Approach 
    With all the measures taken, one would expect that the combat of or-
ganized crime in The Netherlands has been successful. Earlier this year , an 
evaluation was concluded of the repressive approach to organized crime 
 groups  12. The researchers investigated how many of the organized groups 
that were recorded with CIUs in 1991 have had dealings with the police and 
the judiciary in the meantime. Only considered were arrests and convic -
tions of the 260 core members of the 58 crime groups concerned . Only half 
of them were arrested on one or more occasions as crime suspects . Not 
every police booking will lead to a trial in court . Between 1991 and 1995, 
78 persons were convicted by a court , i.e. 30 percent of the total number of 
core members. Considering the data at group level , it is found that some of 
the core members of most organized groups have been convicted in court . 
Of the 58 groups, only five saw all of their core members convicted . Of one 
third of the organized groups active in the Netherlands in 1991, not a single 
core member has been convicted in the past five years . This rather poor 
result appears to contradict the priority which has been given since the mid-
Eighties to tackling organized crime. 
   The researchers name a number of possible causes of the apparent in-
sufficiency of the penal approach of organized crime . Firstly, they refer to 
the fact that the study is based on CIU registers, which mainly contain soft 
information. Investigations may reveal that registered persons have actu -
ally played no role or a less prominent role in criminal activities than had 
been indicated at the time by the CIU source. Secondly , it may occur that an 
investigation fails to make good progress , for instance in the case of a for-
eign criminal group. Thirdly, some investigations are unsuccessful in find-
ing legal evidence of someone's involvement in punishable activities . In 
the fourth place, the judicial handling of a case may take a very long time . 
Evaluations have established that this is the case where the matter concerns 
a charge of membership of an outlawed organization and in drug offences 
So, there is always the chance of a number of core members being con-
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victed later. And, last but not least, it is possible that police forces chose 
other criminal groups to combat instead of the ones registered in the na-
tional survey. It is important to point out that the study dealt with the groups 
mentioned in the 1991 inventory, and that in the Netherlands national pri-
orities have been set only since 1993. It is unknown which factor is the 
principal barrier to an effective approach to organized crime. Presumably, 
it is a combination of the said conditions.
   4.6 Core Teams 
   After the "discovery" of organized crime in the Netherlands in the 
mid-Eighties, the idea has spread that this form of crime should not be tack-
led at regional level only. Therefore, five supraregional investigative teams, 
so-called core teams, have been set up in 1992. Meanwhile, a sixth team 
and a national investigative team have been formed. The required comple-
ment of the teams is predominantly provided by the regional police forces, 
the CRI and the Tax Information and Investigation Service. The police re-
gions contribution is the largest: in principle one percent of their comple-
ment. The core teams consist of a staff of between 60 and one hundred. 
There is a clear relation between the core teams and the regional forces 
involved, which is clear if the management is considered. A core team is 
placed under a regional force as far as the management is concerned, whereas 
the authority is vested in a Chief Public Prosecutor. In some cases, the orga-
nizational relation between the team and the managing force is so intensive 
that the team can hardly be distinguished from a regular investigation unit. 
    The teams utilize the latest views and methods in order to tackle orga-
nized crime. In 1994, two years after formal realization of most of the core 
teams, a first attempt at evaluating them was made; however, it was a fail-
ure since many of the teams were still engaged in their first inquiries. Be-
coming operational had brought with it bureaucratic growing pains. Appar-
ently the setting up of multi-agency teams tends to lead to problems in the 
field of responsibilities, competence and legal position. Moreover, experi-
ences teaches that investigations into international organized criminal groups 
often take more than two years. Some of them have been going on for as 
many as three years. 
    Another problem is the manner in which a selection is made of which 
criminal group will be dealt with. In 1993 a special national council was 
established for this: the Coordinating Policy Council (CBO), which is pre-
sided by a prosecutor-general and is mainly composed of chief public pros-
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 ecutors which are responsible for the penal policy of core teams
. The deci-
 sion as to which criminal grouping are , is based on the results of the na-
 tional inventories on organized crime in the Netherlands . The regional po-
 lice forces oppose the central role by the CBO , as they consider this an 
 interfering with matters which are of regional importance . The competence 
of the CBO, however, is outweighed by the monopoly the regional police 
forces have as regards information . Their influence lies in the data they 
supply to the benefit of the national inventories . Some of the regional forces 
are reluctant to supply information as they do not want the results of the 
inventories to be used for priorities-setting since they are not in a positi
on 
to exercise much influence on the outcome of the analyses . But also the 
core teams do not seem to be happy with the role of the CBO . In many cases 
they do not fulfill the obligation to draw up action plans and inform the 
Coordinating Policy Council on progress made during an investigati
on. 
Sometimes an investigation almost automatically passes into another in -
vestigation, because the borders of a criminal network can hardly be de -
fined and the investigators simply continue their work by following lead
s to 
other  suspects. These are the reasons why core teams select investigations 
rather at random, and their choice is especially determined by previous in -
vestigations and by regional preferences . National considerations and the 
wish for an adequate approach to internationally operating criminal groups 
play a minor role in the setting of priorities. 
    In a number of cases, the core teams have been successful . They have 
found ways to get a hold of the leaders of criminal organizations
, although 
great efforts were necessary to achieve results. However, these leaders some-
times continue giving direction to criminal activities from the prison or peni -
tentiary institute they are in . Lower ranking criminals are often not or hardly 
prosecuted and are detained for a short while only or not at all . So, the 
infrastructure, the knowledge and experience of a group are utilized shortly 
after an organization has been dismantled , by the same organization, by 
second and third-rate criminals starting for themselves and by other crimi -
nal organizations. The know-how and experience of the dismantled group 
is used. 
   Although it is still too early for a final conclusion , it seems that the 
repressive approach by big , multi-disciplinary teams has not worked very 
well, i.a. due to the dynamics , the network characteristics and the shielding 
off of criminal organizations. Another disadvantage for the coreteams is the 
inadequate organization in the field of investigation . Priorities are not well-
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considered, cooperation between the different disciplines represented in the 
teams is not always smooth, and the duration of investigations results in 
fatigue and demotivation.
  4.7 The Parliamentary Inquiry into Investigation Methods 
   Partly because of the almost complete shielding off of the CIUs in 
comparison with other parts of the police organization, some very serious 
incidents have occurred in recent times, i.a. the conscious release of drugs 
onto the criminal market with a view to having an undercover agent rise in 
the hierarchy of a criminal organization. There were other reasons to let 
drugs pass. It occurred that a criminal organization wanted to test a smug-
gling route before sending off a large consignment. The small quantity used 
for the test would then be allowed to go on. Also, larger consignments have 
sometimes been allowed through in order to get a better insight into the role 
of the various members of a criminal organization. In recent years, tons of 
cannabis products and hundreds of kilograms of cocaine have been taken to 
the market with the knowledge of the police and the judiciary. In some 
cases, these methods have achieved the effect desired, and the criminal or-
ganizations concerned could be dismantled. But it also happened that the 
free passage of drugs has not led to the arrest of the top of an organization. 
    The unsuccessful end to some cases and the disagreement within po-
lice and justice circles about the admissibility of this investigation method 
resulted in the disbandment at the end of 1993 of an interregional investiga-
tion team. After investigations into the matter had been held by a specially 
appointed committee as well as a parliamentary working group, the Dutch 
parliament requested a special inquiry into police investigative practices. In 
June 1994, the Minister of Justice instigated such an inquiry to be carried 
out by a committee consisting of seven members of parliament, under chair-
manship of MP Maarten van Traa. On 1 February 1996 the Van Traa com-
mittee presented its findings. The general conclusion was that the investi-
gation into organized crime in the Netherlands suffers from a threefold cri-
sis. In the first place standards are lacking. The legislator, but also the judi-
cature, have given too much leeway to the police and the judicial authori-
ties. In the second place there is inadequate coordination of the investiga-
 tion. Investigation agencies often do not work together - they rather tend to 
 work against one another. And the registration of investigation activities 
 often plays too small a role. In the opinion of the committee, the crisis within 
 the organization manifests itself mainly in unclear decisions regarding who
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 is responsible for what . The areas of authority and the responsibilities of 
 many of those involved are vague . In the third place the public prosecutions 
 department does not exercise sufficient control over the police . Although 
 the public prosecutions department's authority over the police in the Neth -
erlands is explicitly provided for by law , in practice this does not always 
 appear to be taken as a matter of course . 
    In short, the Van Traa committee came to the generaI conclusion that 
the crisis within the Dutch investigation agencies runs deep and even touches 
upon the legitimacy of law enforcement . Those responsible in the police , 
the public prosecutions department and the Ministries of Internal Affairs 
and Justice have exercised insufficient authority . But the parliamentary com-
mittee was not just pointing the finger elsewhere; there was a political short-
fall in the provision of legislation and in the setting of standards . 
    The parliamentary inquiry led to the forced dismissal of one of the five 
prosecutors-general, of the secretary general of the Ministry of Justice and 
the head of a regional CIU . Furthermore, a number of public prosecutors 
and chiefs of police were given positions elsewhere . The parliamentary com-
mittee justly commented that the crisis in the investigation and prosecution 
cannot be solved by some drastic short term measures . It is necessary that a 
revision take place of the functioning with regard to investigation , so that 
solutions for the long term can be sought . 
                   5. Proposed Measure
    A vision about a future approach to organized crime must on the one 
hand be based on an assessment of nature , size and development of orga-
nized crime, and on the other on a recognition of the possibilities and re-
strictions of measures taken in the past . Only in this broad perspective will 
an idea be created of what must happen to arrive at a more effective ap -
proach. 
   Especially in recent years has the approach to organized crime rapidly 
developed. It is widely recognized that the approach should be supraregional , 
interdisciplinary and integral . Still, the police and judiciary do not succeed 
in gaining terrain on organized crime . At the most, it can be said that the 
last few years have seen a stabilization , after the strong rise in the preceding 
decade. 
   Dismantling groups of offenders does not automatically lead to a re -
duction of organized crime. In fact , any vacancy in a dynamic market will 
soon be filled. Elimination of a drugs gang may lead to a temporary short -
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 age  of  drugs  on  the  market.  This  will  result  in  a price rise and other sellers 
making more profits with the same effort. Moreover, it will be more attrac-
tive for criminal groups that have not been engaged in drugs trafficking to 
manifest themselves on the market as sellers. Legislation, too, only has lim-
ited effect on organized crime. Foreign criminal groups no longer launder 
their profits through Dutch banking institutions, but take cash money abroad. 
They use all sorts of property schemes to prevent their criminal assets from 
being confiscated. 
   It is therefore high time that the traditional penal approach be renewed 
and enhanced. Traditional penal law is based on trying separate criminal 
incidents by individual suspects and is therefore not fitted for tackling orga-
nized criminal groups. In modern constitutional states, the criminal pros-
ecution process is highly sophisticated and demanding, and the creation of 
new legislation is a time-consuming affair. Organized crime is character-
ized by its flexibility and dynamic nature. Prosecution and procedural pos-
sibilities therefore always lag behind the latest trends in organized crime. 
More energy should be spent in the preventative aspect of countering crime. 
Until recently, the possibilities to take preventive measures in this area have 
been given unjustifiably little attention. 
    A condition for effective prevention measures is insight into the way 
in which organized crime arises and the conditions that stimulate or slow 
down its growth. The analysis of the structural opportunities open to orga-
nized crime is called "phenomenon research". This type of research is fo-
cused on identifying and tackling so-called criminogenic factors: structural 
characteristics of an economic branch, a geographical area, a criminal mar-
ket or another segment of society, which contribute to the arisal or growth 
of organized crime. 
    An example of a successful "phenomenon research" project was un-
 dertaken in Amsterdam some years ago. Police investigations had revealed 
 that exchange offices in the city centre were involved in criminal activities. 
 There were approx. 100 such offices in the centre and analysis established 
 that the exchange transactions by tourists could not make these offices cost-
 effective. It was further found that there were a number of clusters of of-
 fices, owned by a small number of families. One family was subjected to 
 further investigations. In seven months they had a turnover of 100 million 
 US dollar, while the exchange transactions with tourists only accounted for 
 ten percent of this amount. The phenomenon research project ensued in a 
 law, which provides that a licence was needed to run an exchange office
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 and that exchange officers are under the supervision of the Dutch Cent
ral 
 Bank. Since the act came into effect , the number of exchange offices in 
 Amsterdam has diminished considerably . 
    Typical of "phenomenon research" is the use of information from open 
 sources, such as public press and criminological literature
, and from half-
open sources, such as the databases of the Chambers of Commerce and the 
Land Registry Office. Data from police investigations can also contribute 
to getting a good picture of the area under study . If, during the first scan-
ning, there are indications that something is possibly wrong in the area
, a d
raft risk model can be drawn up , by means of which a special inventory 
can be made of possibly wrongdoing enterprises and groups . 
    A draft risk model describes what the impact is of sector characteris -
tics and social process on the vulnerability of a certain sector to penetration 
by organized crime groups. An example is the waste processing industry in 
the Netherlands. With the strict environment protection regulations drawn 
up by the central government in recent years , legally processing all sorts of 
waste has become much more expensive . As a consequence it has become 
much more lucrative to process waste , observing the rules in theory, but in 
reality having waste disappear in all sorts of illegal ways . It stands to reason 
that the more sorts of waste are processed by a company , the easier will it 
become to mix waste flows. With this , a risk factor has been identified 
which possibly furthers illegal practices and which therefore gives direc -
tion to the investigation. 
   Another form of risk modelling is that of the manner in which an ille -
gal product or service is produced and distributed. This type of "logistics" 
modelling was developed by the German Federal Criminal Police Office 
(BKA) a few years ago.13 It is based upon the idea that organized crime 
shows many businesslike structures as well as economically oriented plan -
ning. If it is true that legal and illegal business activities are similar
, the 
logistic processes of organized crime can be analysed from the point of 
view of legal business practices . From an endproduct it can be deducted 
which activities must be carried out . The following phases can be distin-
guished in the amphetamine production and trafficking process: acquiring 
the necessary chemicals, equipment and knowledge (precursor phase)
, pro-
cessing (production phase), smuggling (transport phase) , wholesale (distri-
bution phase) and peddling (sales phase) . Critical analysis of the criminal 
business process for weak spots may give new insight into what actions can 
be taken. In the case of synthetic drugs the focus of the inquiry could be
 3j347) 1 { f : ~:: VJ 31y 3 F, 
whether the availability to criminals of certain chemicals required in the 
processing can be affected. On the basis of a phenomenon study that was 
recently concluded, the researchers recommended not only the introduction 
of a licensing system but also argued that agreements with the chemical 
industry should be made about the reporting to the police of unusual trans-
actions with certain chemicals. 
   The added value of "phenomenon research" is giving an insight into 
the relation between upperworld and underworld and with that society's 
vulnerability. On the basis of that insight, a structural approach can be taken, 
both preventive and repressive, because increased insight into the vulner-
ability of (parts of) society will make politicians, authorities, professional 
groups and industrial sectors more aware of the risk, and as a consequence, 
more able to defend themselves. 
6. Conclusion
   Organized crime knows so many ways to manifest itself, that it is im-
possible to develop a blueprint for the strategy to combat it. An integral 
approach characterized by smoothly and dynamically adjusting to the vari-
ous and constantly changing manifestations of organized crime is the most 
obvious solution. Knowledge about the nature and development of orga-
nized crime is a requirement. It is therefore crucial that empirical findings 
and theoretical insights on the nature of organized crime are constantly ex-
changed among all who are involved in the combat. This takes a lot of time 
and effort, but it does eventually lead to results. 
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